EVIDIQ Clause
Decoding documents.
Proving truth.
Clause turns agreements and policy documents into plain language and makes the reading checkable. Every statement carries the quoted span it came from, and the server mechanically verifies that quote against your document before it reaches you — a fabricated clause is dropped, not returned. The reasoning runs on 0G Compute, only on models whose TEE attestation is checked live against the router registry, and every paid response records the provider address, request id and exact cost. The sealed report — JCS digest, EIP-191 signature, chain linkage, 0G anchor — can be re-verified by anyone, for free, forever. 8 tools (3 free, 5 paid).

EVIDIQ Clause
Agent #10584Quickstart
Connect the Streamable HTTP MCP endpoint, ask what the service can do for free, then buy a decoding.
claude mcp add --transport http evidiq-clause https://mcp.evidiq.dev/clause/mcp
The free tools answer a bare call — try capabilities:
curl -s -X POST https://mcp.evidiq.dev/clause/mcp -H "content-type: application/json" -d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"capabilities","arguments":{}}}'Or probe the public pricing discovery endpoint and the Skill file:
curl -s https://mcp.evidiq.dev/clause/x402
curl -s https://mcp.evidiq.dev/clause/skill.md
What Clause is for
Citations are checked, not trusted
Every statement carries a quote plus character offsets into your document. The server locates the quote verbatim and DROPS any statement whose quote is not there, reporting citationsDropped. An invented clause is mechanically impossible, not a matter of prompt discipline.
The reasoning step is attributable
Inference runs on 0G Compute, only on models whose tee_attested is true — checked against the router's live registry at call time, not a hardcoded allowlist. Each report records model, provider address, request id, TDX attestation and the exact cost in wei.
The record is sealed
A JCS digest over a closed field set, an EIP-191 signature, chained to the previous report so a removed record shows as a sequence gap, and anchored to 0G Storage — with the anchored body sealed with AES-256-GCM unless anchorInClear is set.
Checking is free
verify_report re-verifies the digest, the signature, the chain and every citation against the supplied source. It never calls the model — it is pure cryptography and string matching, and it never will call the model.
Unsupported stays unsupported
A tenancy agreement with no arbitration clause answers "unsupported" with a stated reason. A plausible-sounding venue is caught by the citation check and dropped before it reaches you.
What it is not
Not legal advice, no outbound fetching (documents arrive in the request as text or base64 pages), no marketplace reputation fields.
Eight MCP tools
Three free tools support discovery and verification; five paid tools carry the decoding.
Paid tools
- decode_document — Plain-language rendering, section by section. Every rendered statement carries the quoted original span it came from; statements the model cannot quote are never asserted. (0.05 USDT0)
- risk_flags — The seven hazards enumerated: auto-renewal, unilateral change, liability cap, penalty, notice period, assignment, arbitration venue. Each flag: severity, quoted span, why it matters to the reader. (0.10 USDT0)
- obligation_calendar — Dated duties extracted into a schedule: what is owed, by whom, when, from which quoted clause. Relative dates resolved against a caller-supplied reference date. (0.10 USDT0)
- compare_documents — Two documents diffed on meaning rather than characters, with which side each change favours and the quoted spans on both sides, each verified against its own source. (0.15 USDT0)
- verdict_report — Decode + flags + calendar + bottom line, two-pass: an extractor, then an independent reviewing pass that must justify or drop each flag. EIP-191 signed, chained, anchored to 0G Storage, full compute trace. (0.25 USDT0)
Free preflight and verification
- capabilities — Tool list, exact prices, the models in use with their TEE status, limits. (free)
- verify_report — Recomputes the JCS digest, checks the EIP-191 signature, walks the chain for gaps, re-checks every citation against the supplied source text. Pure cryptography and string matching — free forever. (free)
- quote — The exact x402 challenge for any paid tool, from the same table the gate charges from. (free)
x402 pricing
| Tool | Atomic | USDT0 | Access |
|---|---|---|---|
| decode_document | 50000 | 0.05 | x402-paid |
| risk_flags | 100000 | 0.10 | x402-paid |
| obligation_calendar | 100000 | 0.10 | x402-paid |
| compare_documents | 150000 | 0.15 | x402-paid |
| verdict_report | 250000 | 0.25 | x402-paid |
| capabilities | 0 | Free | Always ungated |
| verify_report | 0 | Free | Always ungated |
| quote | 0 | Free | Always ungated |
Priced on the LIFESTYLE band: the category median is 0.175 USDT0 and the incumbent document-decoding service sells at 0.02–0.10. Payments use x402 v2 exact with USDT0 (6 decimals) on X Layer (eip155:196) via the official OKX Onchain OS Payment SDK.
Paying from your agent (x402)
decode_document and the other four paid tools are metered with x402 v2 (scheme exact, EIP-3009, USDT0 on X Layer / eip155:196). An unpaid call returns HTTP 402 with the payment requirements; the agent signs a gasless authorization and retries with a PAYMENT-SIGNATURE header. The three free tools need no payment — a plain application/json request works.
// 1. Unpaid call -> HTTP 402 with payment requirements
const { accepts: [req] } = await (await callClause()).json();
// 2. Sign EIP-3009 transferWithAuthorization (gasless for the payer)
const authorization = {
from: account.address, to: req.payTo, value: req.amount,
validAfter: "0", validBefore: String(now + 600), nonce: randomHex32(),
};
const signature = await account.signTypedData({
domain: { name: req.extra.name, version: req.extra.version,
chainId: Number(req.network.split(":")[1]), verifyingContract: req.asset },
types: { TransferWithAuthorization: EIP3009_TYPES },
primaryType: "TransferWithAuthorization", message: authorization,
});
// 3. Retry with PAYMENT-SIGNATURE -> server settles, returns the decoded report
const paid = await callClause({
"PAYMENT-SIGNATURE": base64({ x402Version: 2, accepted: req,
payload: { signature, authorization } }),
});Settlement
Five real paid calls settled on X Layer on 2026-08-06, every one status "settled" — 0.65 USDT0 total (payer and payee are both the fleet wallet, so the balance is unchanged by design; these are evidence of settlement, not revenue).
decode_document (0.05, 21s): 0x5f6a50dc…f87e2
risk_flags (0.10, 13s): 0x69f37d98…eda6e
obligation_calendar (0.10, 9s): 0x8a1f9831…f99a
compare_documents (0.15, 22s): 0x909eacc1…55a8f
verdict_report (0.25, 85s): 0x5ac9ef15…ff3c8a
total: 0.65 USDT0
0G Storage Anchoring (chain 16661)
verdict_report (seq 6): 0x832f9330…17d92 · root 0xaaaa989e…32b9b · citationsDropped 0
digest: 0x215b1b00…b2ab5
signer: 0x8a3c7524Aaed081825aC88eC7f4cCECFc583ee7D (EIP-191)
compute: qwen3-vl-30b (TDX/dstack) + deepseek-v4-flash (TDX/dstack) — provider, request id and wei costs recorded per pass
The anchored body is sealed with AES-256-GCM; the readable manifest carries sequence, previous hash, digest, timestamp and compute traces.
Verification Log
All eight tools exercised live against the deployed endpoint with the x402 gate enforced, measured from outside; the paid run settled the five tools above and verify_report re-verified the signed verdict (digest, signature, chain, citations) and detected a one-character tamper. Genuine asciinema capture with --idle-time-limit 2— waits over two seconds are shortened; no frame was edited. Raw run, the five paid outputs and the signed report in the clause repo.
Tests → 40/40 across twelve gates (C1 C2 C3 T1 T2 F1 F2 G1 V1 B1 S1 L1)
Gate (measured from outside)
5 paid bare {} → 402 with x402 challenge
no content-type → 415 · empty body → 402
3 free bare {} → 200
Settled paid calls (X Layer, 2026-08-06)
decode_document 21s · risk_flags 13s · obligation_calendar 9s
compare_documents 22s · verdict_report 85s → 0.65 USDT0 total
verify_report on the signed verdict (seq 6)
digestMatch true · signatureValid true · chain ok · citations 0 failures
one character flipped → digestMatch false · signatureValid false
License
EVIDIQ owns and licenses its original Clause code under MIT. Third-party dependencies maintain their own open-source licenses in THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md.