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EVIDIQ Envelope

Bulwark reads what the message says.

Envelope proves who sent it.

Agents now read mailboxes and act on what they find. Envelope is the missing direction: cryptographic verification of inbound messages — SPF, DKIM, DMARC and ARC on the raw message, sender-spoofing and lookalike-domain detection, header-chain forensics, and structural risk of attachments and links — with the DNS answers pinned into a signed report. 18 tools (8 free, 10 paid).

Listing under review

EVIDIQ Envelope

Agent #10435

OKX.AI listing

https://www.okx.ai/agents/10435

Submitted for approval; the endpoint below is already live.

Open

MCP endpoint

https://mcp.evidiq.dev/envelope/mcp

Streamable HTTP, x402-gated. Free tools answer without payment.

Quickstart

Connect the Streamable HTTP MCP endpoint, inspect capabilities, and validate a message before paying for a verdict.

claude mcp add --transport http evidiq-envelope https://mcp.evidiq.dev/envelope/mcp

Or probe the public pricing discovery endpoint:

curl -s https://mcp.evidiq.dev/envelope/x402

Prefer a Skill file? Fetch the agent-readable EVIDIQ Envelope Skill:

curl -s https://mcp.evidiq.dev/envelope/skill.md

What Envelope is for

Transport Authenticity

SPF, DKIM, DMARC and ARC over the raw message — per-signature DKIM detail, RFC 7489 identifier alignment, ARC chain validation for forwarded mail.

Never Intent

A message from a genuine but compromised account passes every check. Every verdict says so in its own body — authenticity of transport, never intent or safety.

Absence Is Not Evidence

No DKIM signature does not mean forged; a valid signature does not mean safe. Both directions are stated in the response.

Pinned DNS

Every report carries the DNS answers the verdict was derived from, so a verdict is meaningful against the records as they stood at verification time.

Never a Proxy

Envelope never fetches a URL found in a message, never opens or extracts an attachment, never sends mail, and never persists the raw message.

Attestation

attest_message_verdict returns a JCS-digested, EIP-191-signed, 0G-anchored report — the record that survives key rotation.

Eighteen MCP tools

Eight free tools support discovery, validation, and verification. Ten paid tools run the cryptographic checks.

Paid verification tools

Free preflight and verification

x402 pricing

ToolAtomicUSDT0Access
verify_dkim50000.005x402-paid
check_dmarc_alignment50000.005x402-paid
verify_message_auth100000.01x402-paid
validate_arc_chain100000.01x402-paid
detect_sender_spoofing150000.015x402-paid
audit_header_chain150000.015x402-paid
assess_attachment_surface200000.02x402-paid
assess_link_surface200000.02x402-paid
screen_domain_posture200000.02x402-paid
attest_message_verdict300000.03x402-paid
envelope_capabilities0FreeAlways ungated
estimate_cost0FreeAlways ungated
validate_message_input0FreeAlways ungated
parse_message_structure0FreeAlways ungated
explain_auth_result0FreeAlways ungated
check_dns_txt0FreeAlways ungated
verify_envelope_report0FreeAlways ungated
get_artifact0FreeAlways ungated

Payments use x402 v2 exact scheme with USDT0 (6 decimals) on X Layer (eip155:196). Verification and settlement run through the official OKX Onchain OS Payment SDK.

Settled on X Layer

Live tool calls verified on-chain via OKX Facilitator:

paid call: 0xb8e6ede…15e51a0 · verify_dkim

agent wallet: 0x2a8efe30…a992ca4fc9b0

0G Storage Anchoring (0G mainnet, chain 16661)

anchor tx: 0xcbd7f01…891de5 · status 0x1

storage root: 0xa377a863…bbe23d147

Verification Log

The fixture gate passed 7/7 against mailauth 4.13.3 (three deviations reported and operator-approved: body-hash and missing-key label as neutral not-pass; strict identifier alignment computed locally per RFC 7489 because mailauth's strict mode compares registrable domains). All 18 tools exercised live end-to-end by the OpenClaw agent (glm-5.2) against the deployed endpoint on 2026-08-03; the 402 gate is on. Raw run + report in the envelope repo.

Free Tools (HTTP 200)
  envelope_capabilities        → 200 ✓ (18 tools, 8 claim limits)
  estimate_cost                → 200 ✓ (verify_message_auth = 0.01 USDT0)
  validate_message_input       → 200 ✓ (parseable, which paid checks can run)
  parse_message_structure      → 200 ✓ (9 headers, 1 Received hop, structure only)
  explain_auth_result          → 200 ✓ (code explained + what it does not prove)
  check_dns_txt                → 200 ✓ (SPF -all · DMARC reject · selector)
  verify_envelope_report       → 200 ✓ (signatureValid: true, fleet signer)
  get_artifact                 → 200 ✓ (artifact with anchorRoot + anchorTx)

Paid Tools (HTTP 200 — bypass mode, Phase 1)
  verify_dkim                  → 200 ✓ (0/1 signatures, not-pass with reason)
  check_dmarc_alignment        → 200 ✓ (dmarc-not-aligned, adkim=s aspf=s)
  verify_message_auth          → 200 ✓ (not-authenticated; DKIM/SPF/DMARC)
  validate_arc_chain           → 200 ✓ (no-arc-chain — normal for direct mail)
  detect_sender_spoofing       → 200 ✓ (no-indicators, matches expected sender)
  audit_header_chain           → 200 ✓ (1 hop, internally consistent)
  assess_attachment_surface    → 200 ✓ (risky: .pdf.exe double extension)
  assess_link_surface          → 200 ✓ (structural only, never fetched)
  screen_domain_posture        → 200 ✓ (SPF valid -all · DMARC reject · 6 selectors)
  attest_message_verdict       → 200 ✓ (EIP-191 signed, 0G anchored)

Phase 2 gate (bypass removed) — measured from outside:
  empty POST → 402 · no content-type → 415 · HEAD → 402 (72ms, no hang)
  10 paid bare {} → 402 · 8 free bare {} → 200
  paid call settled on X Layer: 0xb8e6ede…15e51a0 (verify_dkim, 0.005 USDT0)
EVIDIQ Envelope live test report — all 18 tools verified via the OpenClaw agent

License

EVIDIQ owns and licenses its original Envelope code under MIT. Third-party dependencies maintain their own open-source licenses in THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md.